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Notes
COMMUNITY PROPERTY-CONFLICT OF LAWS-RECOVERY OF
.DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES TO NONRESIDENT MARRIED WOMEN
-The plaintiff, a married woman resident of Texas, was injured
in Louisiana due to the negligence of defendant's agent. Defend-
ant claimed that plaintiff did not have a cause of action because
under Texas law the amount which the wife might recover would
constitute community property and a right to the sum could be
asserted only by the husband. Held, Louisiana law would apply
and plaintiff could sue in her own name since under the provi-
sions of the Louisiana Civil Code the amount which plaintiff
might recover would consttitute her separate property and she
could bring suit.1 Matney v. Blue Ribbon, Incorporated, 12 So.
(2d) 523 (La. App. 1942).
The general rule that when a tort is committed in one juris-
diction and a suit is brought in another to recover damages for
such tort the lex loci delicti, that is, the law of the place where
the tort is committed, governs all matters relating to the right of
action is too well settled to be seriously questioned.' As a direct
consequence from this rule it has been held that when a married
woman residing in one state is wrongfully injured in another
she may sue for damages in the state where the tort has been
1. Art. 2334, La. Civil Code of 1870, as amended by La. Act 170 of 1912
provides in part: "The earnings of the wife when living separate and apart
from her husband . . .actions for damages resulting from offenses and quasi
offenses ... are her separate property."
And, Art. 2402, La. Civil Code of 1870, as amended by La. Act 68 of 1902,
provides in part: "But damages resulting from personal. injuries to the wife
shall not form part of this community, but shall always be and remain the
separate property of the wife and recoverable by herself alone."
The case was distinguished by the court from the case of Williams v.
Pope Manufacturing Co., 52 La. Ann. 1417, 27 So. 851, 50 L.R.A. 816, 718 Am.
St. Rep. 390 (1900) in which a married woman, resident of Mississippi, at-
tempted to invoke the property laws of that state in order to recover for a
tort committed in Louisiana. It was held in that case that since under Missis-
sippi law the action was the personal right of the Wife, Louisiana would recog-
nize her right to sue even though the law of Louisiana was different (prior to
La. Act 170 of 1912). The decision was based on grounds of comity and the
situation could clearly be distinguished from the one presented in the Matney
case.
2. Northern Pacific R.R. v. Babcock, 154 U.S. 190, 14 S.Ct. 978, 38 L.Ed.
958, 16 Rose's Notes on U.S. Reports 1126 (1894); Ormsby v. Chase, 290 U.S.
387, 54 S.Ct. 211, 78 L.Ed. 378, 92 A.L.R. 1499 (1933); Alabama G.S.R. v. Carrol,
47 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803, 18 L.R.A. 433, 38 Am. St. Rep. 163 (1892); Yazoo &
M.V.R. v. Littleton, 177 Ark. 199, 5 S.W.(2d) 930, 59 A.L.R. 936 (1928).
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committed when the law of that state gives her a right of action,
notwithstanding the fact that in the state where she is domiciled
such right of action constitutes community property and as such
is recoverable only by her husbandY
By Act 68 of 1902 the Louisiana legislature amending Article
2402 of the Civil Code to the effect that "damages resulting from
personal injuries to the wife shall not form part of this com-
munity, but shall always be and remain the separate property of
the wife and recoverable by herself alone." This constituted the
first legislative proviso concerning the recovery of damages for
personal injury actions in their relation to the community of
acquets and gains. Act 170 of 1912, dealing with this relation be-
tween the recovery of damages and the community property
system, was enacted as an amendment to Article 2334 of the Civil
Code. This act provided that "The earnings of the wife when living
separate and apart from her husband, although not separated by
judgment of court, her earnings when carrying on a business,
trade, occupation or industry separate from her husband, actions
for damages resulting from offenses and quasi offenses and the
property purchased with all funds thus derived, are her separate
property." By Act 168 of 1920 this last act was re-enacted
and amended to the effect that "Actions for damages resulting
from offenses and quasi offenses suffered by the husband, living
separate and apart from his wife, by reason of fault on her part,
sufficient for separation or divorce shall be his separate property."
The case of Sutton v. Champagne4 clearly illustrates the un-
balance or inconsistency which prevails with regard to commun-
ity property so far as damages recovered for personal injuries to
the respective spouses is concerned. It was held that the wife's
share of the amount recovered in an action brought by the spouses
to recover for the death of their son was the wife's separate prop-
erty while the amount recovered by the husband constituted
community property.
The Louisiana jurisprudence seems then to be well settled
to the effect that damages arising from personal injury actions
constitute the separate property of the wife even when she is
3. Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Humble, 181 U.S. 57, 21 S.Ct. 526, 45 L.Ed. 747
(1901); Traglio v. Harris, 104 F.(2d) 439, 127 A.L.R. 803 (1939); W. W. Clyde &
Co. v. Dyess, 126 F.(2d) 719 (1942).
4. 141 La. 469, 75 So. 209 (1917). See also Duchanne v. Smith, 9 La. App.
264, 119 So. 268 (1928); Johnson v. Sundberry, 150 So. 299 (La. App. 1933). Cf.
Simon v. Harrison, 200 So. 476 (La. App. 1941), noted in (1941) 3 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 828. See Daggett, Is Joint Control of Community Property Pos-
sible? (1936) 10 Tulane L. Rev. 589.
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living with her husband, but are the separate property of the
husband only when as provided by the Act of 19205 he is living
"separate and apart from his wife by reason of fault on her part,
sufficient for separation or divorce."
Since damages suffered by a person oftentimes result in a
decrease of the earning capacity of such person, the ideas of
"earnings" and "damages" are closely related and are dealt with
together in Articles 2334 and 2402 of the Civil Code. It is therefore
important to point out in this discussion the relation of "earn-
ings" to the community property.
Prior to the enactment of Act 170 of 19126 the decisions of
our courts awarded the earnings of the wife to the community.7
The language of Act 170 of 1912 seems to have been intended to
'change the jurisprudence as it existed at that time. The legisla-
tive intent appears to have been that the earnings of the wife
were to be her own separate property not only when she was
"living apart from her husband although not separated by judg-
ment of court" but also when she was "carrying on a business,
trade, occupation or industry separate from her husband," and
that likewise the recovery of "damages resulting from offenses
and quasi offenses" were to constitute the separate property of
the wife.
However, when the supreme court was called upon to con-
strue the Act of 1912 the legislative intent was apparently disre-
garded. In the case of Houghton v. Hall" the question presented
was whether the earnings of the wife while she was living with
her husband, although she was pursuing a separate business or
occupation from him, constituted her separate property. The
court held such earnings to be community property by construing
the Act of 1912 as though it read: "The earnings of the wife when
living apart from her husband although not separated by judg-
ment of court, [that is] her earnings when carrying on a business,
trade, occupation or industry separate from her husband. . . are
her separate property." In other words, the second clause of the
act was made illustrative of the first by interposing the words
"that is" where the legislature apparently did not intend to inter-
pose them.
5. La. Act 168 of 1920 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4729-4730], amending Art.
2334, La. Civil Code of 1870.
6. La. Act 170 of 1912, amending Art. 2334, La. Civil Code of 1870.
7. Isaacson v. Mentz, 33 La. Ann. 595 (1881); Succession of Barry, 48 La.
Ann. 1143, 20 So. 656 (1896); Succession of Webre, 49 La. Ann. 1491, 22 So. 390
(1897); Succession of Manning v. Burke, 107 La. 456, 31 So. 862 (1902).
8. 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37 (1933)..
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Apparently the interposing of these words would make the
Act of 1912 contra to the provisions of Act 68 of 19129 because
under such construction it might just as logically be claimed that
actions for damages resulting from offenses and quasi offenses
constitute the separate property of the wife only when the wife
is living separate and apart from her husband. Otherwise, it
would be to say that the words "that is" as interposed by the
court apply to the second clause of the act but do not apply to the
third. Such a position cannot be sustained on logical grounds.
As a matter of social policy the construction placed by the
court on the act seems to be an excellent one. The community
property system like all legal institutions is devised to benefit
society; the community property system achieves this purpose
by strengthening the economic situation of the family. By making
the earnings derived from the separate industry of the wife com-
munity property, the economic power of the family as a unit is
undoubtedly increased. Since the separate earnings of the hus-
band form part of the community there is apparently no reason
why the separate earnings of the wife should not be brought into
this community of acquets and gains.
There are some grounds, however, on which it could be
claimed that it is socially advantageous to make the separate
earnings of the wife her separate property when she is carrying
on such a "business, trade, occupation or industry separate from
her husband." Since the husband is made by law the administra-
tor of the community assets," the possibility exists of worthless
husbands using to their individual advantage the fruits of the
labor and industry of their wives. Another advantage in making
the separate earnings of the wife her separate property would be
presented in case the husband failed in his business enterprises.
His creditors would have a right to hold the community liable,
9. La. Act 68 of 1902, amending Art. 2402, La. Civil Code of 1870.
10. Art. 2334, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The property of married persons is
divided into separate and common property.
"Separate property is that which either party brings into the marriage,
or acquires during the marriage with separate funds, or by inheritance, or by
donation made to him or her particularly. ...
"Common property is that which is acquired by the husband and wife
during marriage, in any manner different from the above declared."
This article as it has been discussed above has been amended by La. Acts
170 of 1912 and 186 of 1920.
11. Art. 2404, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The husband is the head and master
of the partnership or community of ga-ns; he administers its effects, disposes
of the revenues which they produce, and may alienate them by an onerous
title, without the consent and permission of his wife."
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but they could not attack the separate estate of the wife12 and
the family would preserve at least part of its economic resources.
It is then submitted that while the community property sys-
tem is out of "balance" as to the recovery of damages arising from
personal injury actions, the supreme court by its decision in
Houghton v Hall1" has preserved the "balance" with regard to
earnings arising from the separate business, trade, occupation, or
industry of the spouses. R. R. A.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-HABITUAL OFFENDER STATUTE-STATUS
OF FOREIN CONVICTIONs-Defendant was convicted of a felony.
He was later charged by information as being a second offender,
the prior crime having been petty larceny in the sum of $100 in
the state of New York. That offense was a misdemeanor by the
laws of New York, but it would have been a felony if it had been
committed in Louisiana. Defendant then filed a motion to quash
the indictment on the grounds that the habitual offender statute'
was not applicable to his case. Held, that the word "crime" used
in the Louisiana habitual offender statute should be interpreted
to mean a felony and not to include a misdemeanor. Hence, the
prior offense must have been a felony by the laws of the particu-
lar state in which it was committed in order to hold the accused
as a multiple offender. Since the defendant was convicted of a
misdemeanor in New York, the habitual offender statute is in-
applicable and the motion to quash is sustained. State v. Johnson,
13 So. (2d) 268 (La. 1943).
One of the most difficult problems in administering the ha-
bitual criminal statutes has been to determine what effect should
be given convictions in foreign states. 2 There are two views: the
12. The community property is liable for the separate debts of the hus-
band whether such debts were contracted either before or after the creation
of the community. Glenn v. Elam, 3 La. Ann. 611 (1848); Davis v. Compton, 13
La. Ann. 396 (1858); Hawley v. Crescent City Bank, 26 La. Ann. 230 (1874);
Succession of Moore, 42 La. Ann. 332, 7 So. 561 (1890). On the other hand, the
community is not liable for the debts of the wife which are clearly her own,
whether such debts were contractbd before marriage or afterwards. Flogny v.
Hatch, 12 Mart.(O.S.) 82 (La. 1822); Kennedy v. Bossiere, 16 La. Ann. 445
(1862); Jones v. Read, 1 La. Ann. 200 (1846). See Daggett, The Community
Property System of Louisiana (1931) 48-51.
13. 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37 (1933).
1. La. Act 15 of 1928, repealed and re-enacted by La. Act 45 of 1942 [Dart's
Crim. Stats. (1943) § 709].
2. The problem is ably discussed in Comment (1939) 2 LOUISIANA LAW
REviEw 177.-
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